Jihadist Violence and Political Upheaval in the Sahel and West Africa: A Region in Crisis

Introduction

The Sahel and West Africa have emerged as the global epicenter of jihadist violence, accounting for 51% of worldwide terrorism-related deaths in 2024. This crisis, fueled by a lethal combination of political instability, military coups, and the withdrawal of Western security assistance, has reshaped the region’s geopolitical landscape. The rise of military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—collectively forming the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)—and their pivot toward Russian security partnerships have further destabilized the region. Meanwhile, jihadist groups like Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel) exploit governance vacuums, spreading violence southward into coastal West Africa and deepening a humanitarian catastrophe affecting millions. This report examines the drivers, dynamics, and consequences of this multifaceted crisis.

1. The Jihadist Surge: Tactics, Expansion, and Human Toll

1.1. Escalating Violence and Strategic Shifts

• Global Terrorism Hotspot: The Sahel accounted for 3,885 terrorism-related deaths in 2024, with Burkina Faso alone suffering 1,532 fatalities. JNIM and IS Sahel have intensified attacks using drones, IEDs, and mass-casualty raids, targeting state forces, civilians, and critical infrastructure.
• Geographic Spread: Violence has spilled into coastal states like Benin, Togo, and Ghana. In 2024, JNIM conducted over 60 attacks in northern Benin, killing 150+ security personnel and displacing 50,000 civilians.
• Urban Threats: High-profile strikes near capitals, including a October 2024 attack on Niamey’s Seno quarter, demonstrate jihadists’ ability to penetrate urban centers.

1.2. Civilian Impact and Displacement

• Displacement Crisis: Nearly 5 million people are forcibly displaced across the Sahel and coastal West Africa—a 25% increase since 2020. Burkina Faso hosts 3.65 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), many trapped in jihadist-controlled zones.
• Human Rights Abuses: Both jihadists and state forces have committed atrocities. In Burkina Faso’s Centre-Nord region, JNIM massacred 200–600 civilians in June 2024 during a trench-digging initiative. State-backed militias, such as the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP), have retaliated with extrajudicial killings.

2. Political Upheaval: Coups, Juntas, and Regional Fragmentation

2.1. The Coup Wave and Authoritarian Consolidation

• Military Takeovers: Since 2020, six coups have occurred in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Guinea. The AES juntas cite “ineffective governance” against terrorism but have prolonged transitions, suppressed dissent, and deferred elections.
• AES Formation: In July 2024, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger formalized the AES, a mutual defense pact opposing Western influence. The bloc withdrew from ECOWAS in January 2025, imposing a 0.5% tariff on ECOWAS goods and deepening regional divides.

2.2. ECOWAS in Crisis

• Erosion of Influence: ECOWAS, once a pillar of regional integration, struggles to enforce democratic norms. The AES’s exit has fragmented trade and security cooperation, with coastal states launching the Accra Initiative to bolster border security.
• Diplomatic Stalemates: ECOWAS’s threat of military intervention in Niger post-2023 coup failed, revealing the bloc’s diminished leverage.

3. Security Vacuum: Western Withdrawal and Russian Entrenchment

3.1. Collapse of International Missions

• French Exit: France withdrew its 5,100 Barkhane forces by 2023, followed by the UN’s MINUSMA peacekeepers. The U.S. handed over its Nigerien bases in August 2024, ending a decade-long counterterrorism presence.
• Impact: Security voids enabled jihadists to capture rural territories and attack convoys. In Mali, IS Sahel doubled its controlled areas after French withdrawal.

3.2. Russia’s Expanding Footprint

• Wagner to Africa Corps: Approximately 2,500 Russian personnel (formerly Wagner Group) operate across the AES, focusing on regime protection rather than counterinsurgency. They train junta forces and guard mining sites (e.g., Mali’s Loulo-Gounkoto gold mines).
• Strategic Gains: Russia secures uranium (Niger), gold (Burkina Faso), and diplomatic clout, leveraging AES support in international forums like the UN.

4. Humanitarian Catastrophe: Aid Challenges and Climate Pressures

4.1. Unprecedented Needs

• Food Insecurity: Over 40 million people in the Sahel face acute hunger, exacerbated by jihadist blockades and climate shocks. In Nigeria’s northeast, 4.4 million risk starvation.
• Healthcare Collapse: 12,000 schools and 200+ health centers have closed in Burkina Faso and Mali. Cholera outbreaks in Niger’s Tillabéri region affected 10,000+ in 2024.

4.2. Funding Shortfalls and Access Barriers

• EU and UN Response: The EU allocated €160.6 million in 2024, but attacks on aid convoys and bureaucratic hurdles limit delivery. Only 30% of Burkina Faso’s aid appeals were met.
• Climate Crisis: Droughts and floods displace 500,000+ annually, pushing farmers into jihadist-controlled zones for resources.

5. Regional and International Responses

5.1. Coastal States: The Accra Initiative

• Security Coordination: Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo launched joint border patrols and intelligence-sharing, but funding gaps and capacity issues persist.
• Civilian Toll: In Benin’s Pendjari National Park, JNIM killed 30 rangers in 2024, undermining eco-tourism and local economies.

5.2. Western Recalibration

• U.S. Policy Shifts: The Biden administration halted aid to AES juntas under the Leahy Laws but increased support for coastal states. The 2024 Global Fragility Act prioritizes Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire.
• EU’s Dual Approach: While sanctioning junta leaders, the EU funds migration controls through the Sahel Alliance, drawing criticism for prioritizing border security over humanitarian needs.

5.3. Russia’s Opportunism

• Military-Led Partnerships: Russia’s Africa Corps provides AES states with drones and anti-aircraft systems, yet fails to curb jihadist advances. In Mali, jihadist attacks rose 40% post-Wagner arrival.
• Economic Exploitation: Russian firms extract gold and uranium under opaque contracts, diverting resources from public services.

6. Future Outlook: Risks and Pathways

6.1. Escalation Scenarios

• Coastal State Fallout: Jihadist infiltration into southern Benin and Togo could destabilize Gulf of Guinea economies, disrupting 30% of global cocoa exports.
• AES Collapse: Overextension of Russian resources amid the Ukraine war may force troop drawdowns, leaving juntas vulnerable to coups or jihadist takeovers.

6.2. Stabilization Opportunities

• Grassroots Peacebuilding: Groups like Burkina Faso’s Collectif contre l’impunité et la stigmatisation des communautés (CISC) broker local truces, reducing communal violence by 25% in 2024.
• ECOWAS Reform: A proposed 2025 summit could revive dialogue with AES, offering sanctions relief in exchange for democratic reforms.

Conclusion

The Sahel and West Africa’s crisis is a convergence of failed governance, external interference, and climatic adversity. While jihadist groups and military juntas exploit instability, civilians endure unparalleled suffering. The region’s future hinges on inclusive governance, coordinated international aid, and a reevaluation of counterterrorism strategies. Without urgent action, the Sahel’s turmoil will continue radiating outward, threatening global security and perpetuating a cycle of despair for millions.